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McELROY LECTURE
How to Think About Religious Freedom in
an Egalitarian Age
NELSON TEBBE*
Academic works about religious freedom in the United States often
begin with a warning that the jurisprudence is in a state of crisis.'
According to this convention, something must be done to put the religion
provisions of the First Amendment on a firmer foundation.
Today, these warnings have taken on a distinctive urgency and
character in religious freedom jurisprudence. A group of skeptics has been
arguing that a rational approach to religious freedom is necessarily
impossible.2 They believe that the American discourse on free exercise and
nonestablishment is broken and cannot be fixed. All we can do is muddle
through, on this view, seeking patternless solutions to particular, ground-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, and Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School. This is the text of the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law McElroy Lecture,
modified slightly for print and with the addition of footnote references. Warm thanks to the
faculty and students at University of Detroit Mercy School of Law for the kind invitation
and for extremely useful feedback. Parts of the argument here draw on Nelson Tebbe,
Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (2015) and Nelson Tebbe,
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age (forthcoming, Harvard Univ. Press).
1. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 10 (2014) (noting that the jurisprudence on religious freedom is widely seen to be
"incoherent"); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY l
(2013) ("The American law of freedom of religion is in trouble[.]").
2. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 1, at 1-13; WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8 (2005) (arguing that protecting religious freedom is
"arguably impossible" without intolerable inequality to nonreligious people); STANLEY FISH,
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 11-12 (1999); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 123 (1995)
(arguing that efforts to make sense of the Religion Clauses are "doomed"); Stanley Fish,
Where's the Beef? 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2014) (arguing that "there is no
satisfactorily rational way of dealing with" cases concerning free exercise and
nonestablishment); but cf Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV.
154, 155 (2014) [hereinafter Hobby Lobby Moment] ("[T]he very notion of religious
liberty-its terms and its value-has become an increasingly contested subject [at least
outside courts].").
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level disputes. This skeptical criticIue has been influential in the literature
on religious freedom jurisprudence.
Here, I investigate this brand of skepticism. That is, I ask whether it is
possible to answer questions of religious freedom in a way that is rationally
justified-or warranted, a term I use in the same way-and, relatedly,
whether legal proposals on such matters must be arbitrary or conclusory.
Figuring out the answer is important because the skeptics' critique has
power. It is also important because their way of working on concrete
questions of religion and equality actually shares much with the methods of
the thinkers they criticize. What distinguishes the skeptics is not their
manner of deciding cases but their grim evaluation of that method. So, if
their critique is correct, it implicates a variety of familiar approaches.
My conclusion today will be that it is in fact possible to make
reasoned arguments for and against outcomes, even in cases that involve
the fraught relationship between religious freedom and equality law. I
build up this argument in several steps in what follows. First, I describe the
contemporary situation in greater detail, along with the skeptical critique.
Second, I offer a method for resolving such disputes in a manner that is
rationally justified, and I refer to it as a social coherence approach.
Finally, I give an example of how social coherence works in a
religious freedom dispute that is at the leading edge of contemporary
debates-namely, the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court's
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. As is well known, the Court in that
case ruled that a company could refuse to provide health insurance that
covered female contraception despite a requirement imposed by the Obama
Administration under the Affordable Care Act.5 Hobby Lobby argued that
its religious opposition to covering contraception entitled it to an
exemption, and the Court agreed.6
I argue below that the Court's opinion in Hobby Lobby was incoherent
because of one specific problem. Namely, the Hobby Lobby Court was
insufficiently concerned about shifting the cost of accommodating the
employer's religious beliefs onto its employees who may not share those
beliefs. That failure to protect against third-party harms risked violating a
3. There are several ways to measure this influence, none of them bulletproof One
is that Steven Smith, whose work features a critique of the possibility of coherent argument
on questions of religious freedom today, has been called the leading figure on questions of
religious freedom and by a highly regarded expert in the field. Marc DeGirolami, Review of
Steve Smith 's Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom, MPIRROR OF JUSTICE (July
21, 2014), https://perma.cc/U7JE-23TV (calling Steven Smith "the most penetrating and
thoughtful scholar of religious freedom of our generation False").
4. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5. Id. at 2759.
6. Id. at 2775-76, 2785.
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core principle of constitutional law. While ordinarily the costs of
accommodating religious citizens are born by the government or by the
public, here those costs were shifted onto the shoulders of other private
citizens, at least for a time. Protecting religious freedom is critically
important. But, according to a longstanding principle rooted in the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, that freedom cannot come at the
cost of significant harm to third parties.8 Although the Hobby Lobby Court
reaffirmed that principle in name, it failed to observe it in practice.
Nothing in the Court's decision made it contingent on absence of harm to
third parties. And in fact, Hobby Lobby's employees were harmed-they
were denied contraceptive coverage for about a year. That means the
ruling cannot be squared with basic constitutional law and was unjustified.
That is true even though the Court's opinion featured more familiar
doctrines in religious freedom law, sidelining the imperative of avoiding
harm to others. The coherence method allows this conclusion to be backed
up with reasons.
Let me begin by saying a little more about the state of religious
freedom today, albeit from a particular perspective. Recently, diagnoses of
incoherence in the field have taken on a different character because of two
developments that have come to the foreground. Neither of these
developments is without precedent, but they both are newly prominent.
They have shifted the debate in ways that are independent but interrelated.
First is the development I referred to a moment ago: some skeptical
thinkers have been arguing with increasing force and influence that the law
of religious freedom is necessarily rudderless. 9  According to these
skeptics, deep contradictions are endemic to western thought on the
subject, particularly tensions between traditional religious thinking and
secular liberal understandings.'O These skeptics' background narrative also
suggests that religious freedom was once grounded in theology: now that it
is unmoored from that foundation, it must rely on secular justifications.
Yet, secular understandings cannot offer a coherent account of the doctrine
because the law of religious freedom retains remnants of the old view.
Both secular conceptions and traditional convictions coexist in the law,
both enjoy widespread support, and neither can be jettisoned.
7. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, & Nelson Tebbe, The
Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://perma.ec/A4ZTEW6S.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
9. See supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTrNG OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 52 (2001) [hereinafter GETTING OVER EQUALITY]; Steven
D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1869, 1882-83 (2009); GEDICKS, supra note 2, at 123-24; FISH, supra note 2, at 1042-43.
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Consequently, contemporary understandings of the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause will inevitably deploy irrational or ad
hoc thinking. All we can do is muddle through, dealing with new disputes
in a haphazard way that is bound to be patternless. Arguments of
constitutional principle simply cannot be made using available legal
resources. Put somewhat differently, these skeptics believe it is not
possible to have a "theory" of religious freedom today." Again, their
position is one of the most influential academic approaches to the subject
matter at the moment.12
Other thinkers do not go quite as far as the skeptics, but they too could
be read to argue that protecting religious freedom will entail choices that
cannot be justified and therefore will invariably cause regret or even a
sense of tragedy. These scholars sometimes call themselves "tragedians.'
13
Yet another version of the argument, also newly salient in the
literature, is that only religious or theological justifications for religious
freedom are defensible. 14 In sum, doubts about the very possibility of
justified reasoning in religious freedom law have come to characterize one
of the most prominent trends among scholars, and perhaps also among
some number ofjudges and lawmakers.
A second development is more commonly appreciated-that is, the
heightened tension between religious freedom and equality commitments in
law.' 5 In the wake of recent victories for advocates of LGBT rights and
reproductive freedom for women, religious traditionalists have been
pressing for robust exemptions. Hobby Lobby is one example of that
tension manifested in a conversation over the scope of reproductive
freedom for women along with their right to equal membership in society,
politics, and the economy.6
Litigation over marriage equality is another example. Before
Obergefell v. Hodges, religious citizens sought and won protection from
civil rights laws concerning public accommodations, for example, so that
churches can refuse to open their facilities to same-sex wedding
11. See GETTING OVER EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 45-46.
12. See supra note 3.
13. MARC 0. DEGROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 6 (2013); see also
PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION xxv (2011)
[hereinafter AGNOSTIC AGE] (noting that religious freedom jurisprudence will involve
"tragic choices"); see also Hobby Lobby Moment, supra note 2, at 158 and n.20 (citing
AGNOSTIC AGE at 303-06 as an example of a tragedian argument).
14. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational? 112 MICH. L.
REV. 1043, 1053 (2014) ("[R]eligious liberty only makes entire sense on essentially
religious philosophical presuppositions.").
15. See, Hobby Lobby Moment, supra note 2, at 156, 160 (diagnosing today's
perceived tension between religious freedom and civil rights law).
16. See, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799-803 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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receptions. 7 And since Obergefell, some traditionalists have been arguing
for other protections, such as accommodations for marriage license clerks
and other public officials who have religious objections to same-sex
marriage.
Controversies like these have attracted national media attention. I will
have more to say about them later. For now, I just want to highlight the
standoff between religious freedom and equality commitments, particularly
concerning LGBT rights and reproductive freedom for women, though
other antidiscrimination measures have come into play as well.
Accompanying this second development has been a new degree of
political polarization among Americans on questions of religious freedom
generally.' 9 On one side, liberals who were once focused on the plight of
religious minorities, and who therefore supported strong free exercise
rights, now seem more concerned about the potential for religious
conservatives to use those rights to carve out meaningful exemptions from
civil rights laws and other regulations protecting the common good.2 0 On
the other side, traditionalists who once aimed (inter alia) to win a place for
religious convictions in public affairs and government decision-making
have now become more inclined to see themselves as minorities who
require legal exemptions to shield their communities from an overweening
liberal orthodoxy.2 As recently as the early 1990s, these two sides came
together to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which passed
with overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress and which was signed
by President Clinton. 2T Today, religious traditionalists and egalitarians are
deeply divided over the application of that same statute in cases like Hobby
Lobby. Something has changed.
17. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624-26 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
18. For example, Kim Davis, the elected County Clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky
has argued that she should be able to exempt herself from the process of issuing marriage
licenses because of her religious opposition to same-sex marriage. See, e.g., The Associated
Press, Kentucky: Defiant Clerk Loses Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://perma.cc/6QLP-EWVZ. North Carolina passed a law in the leadup to Obergefell that
allows officials to decline to perform marriages because of religious opposition to same-sex
marriage. See, The Associated Press, North Carolina: Suit Filed Over Marriage Recusal
Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/H8KJ-TS86.
19. See Paul Horwitz & Nelson Tebbe, Religious Institutionalism-Why Now? in THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: HOBBY LOBBY AND THE NEW LAW OF RELIGION [N
AMERICA 209 (Micah Schwartzman et al., eds. 2015).
20. Mark Tooley, The Future Belongs To Religious Liberals? THE AMERICAN
SPECTATOR (July 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/3S3S-U3G5; John Riley, ACLU Warns of
Coming Wave of "Religious Exemption" Bills, METRO WEEKLY (Dec. 17, 2005),
https://perma.cc/KM9X-TEZS.
21. Id.
22. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-
4 (1993)).
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In sum, two developments characterize the current moment on these
questions-skepticism about the soundness of religious freedom law and
increased political and legal tension between the First Amendment and
equality law.
But I want to make a further observation, namely that these two
developments are related in some ways. Although skeptics can be found all
across the political spectrum, it is perhaps not completely inaccurate to say
that the most influential voices today are politically conservative, at least
on this question. Some people positioned toward the right on the political
spectrum tend to be pessimistic about the possibility of defending free
exercise under contemporary conditions, and they criticize liberals in the
judiciary (and the academy) for incoherent reasoning.
What is at stake in these claims, practically speaking? They are not
only points of philosophy or jurisprudence. Traditionalists also sometimes
conclude that judges should leave more of the business of protecting
religious freedom to branches of government that are more responsive to
popular politics, such as legislatures and executive offices.2 4 Going further,
they sometimes conclude that constitutional arguments cannot be made in
any forum-that the matter of religious freedom should be left to policy
25preferences. Of course, arguments against court intervention in
democratic decision-making are also made by non-skeptics. 26 For both
sorts of thinkers, room must be made for tradition to influence government
and its lawmaking at least in some local jurisdictions, if not everywhere, in
America. And, that will happen through ordinary politics, through
institutions of representative democracy.
On the other side, progressives have tried to develop approaches to the
subject that are capable of grounding constitutional law on such matters. It
should be acknowledged that many on the left have deemphasized the
23. Cf Paul Horwitz, More "Vitiating Paradoxes ". A Response to Steven D. Smith-
and Smith, 41 PEPP. L. REv. 943, 945-46 (2014) (comparing Steven Smith's skepticism to a
conservative version of critical legal studies). "Politically conservative" here means what it
generally does in conversations about free exercise and nonestablishment, namely seeing a
greater role for religion in public life, including government decision making, expression,
and funding, and looking for greater protection for religious action against general laws.
24. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 10, at 68 (arguing that the rejection of a principled
approach to religious freedom suggests that courts should play a more modest role,
generally, though acknowledging that determining how modest will require additional,
complicated jurisprudential considerations).
25. See id. at 79 ("1 have suggested that there are no satisfactory principles of
religious freedom. If I am right, the most obvious consequence is that in this area courts
cannot act on the basis of genuine principles. But there is another less obvious but perhaps
more interesting consequence: no one else-not a legislature, not a school board can act on
the basis of genuine principles of religious freedom either.").
26. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Review, Local Values, and Pluralism, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 6 (2009) (critiquing judicial review for "homogenizing
community norms").
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courts, highlighting instead the possibility and power of constitutional
interpretation by other actors, not only in the legislature and the executive
branch but also outside government altogether.27  Yet, popular
constitutionalism does not necessarily entail denying that courts play an
important role, and it certainly does not require abandoning constitutional
argument altogether and leaving questions of religious freedom to party
politics. It should also be acknowledged that some progressives are equally
skeptical that reasoned conclusions can be reached on questions of
religious freedom law.28 But many continue to believe that distinctively
legal arguments can continue to be justified even if they do not occur
exclusively or even primarily in the judiciary. 29 They have not been
overwhelmed by doubts about whether legal actors are capable of making
reasonable constitutional arguments on questions of religious freedom. 
3
So the newer challenge for religious freedom jurisprudence comes
from those who question the very notion of justified argument on any and
all legal questions surrounding free exercise and nonestablishment.
The difficulty is that the targets of this criticism have not yet offered a
satisfying answer. They lack an account of why and how principles and
precedents-like the prohibition on government endorsement of religious
truth or the rule of equal treatment for believers and nonbelievers-can be
implemented without arbitrariness or unreason.31 Of course, they have
27. For an overview of the varieties of popular constitutionalism, with citations, see
Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004).
28. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that protecting religious freedom
is "arguably impossible" without intolerable inequality to nonreligious people).
29. That is not to say that people on the left have not attacked the idea of religious
freedom itself An important scholarly movement is criticizing the special solicitude that
religion currently enjoys in constitutional law. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER &
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 52 (2007); BRIAN
LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not
Special? 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). Yet it is important to realize that this critique need
not undermine the very possibility of reasoned approaches to this area of law. It questions
the possibility of religious freedom as a distinctive constitutional doctrine, but it does not
speak to the possibility of constitutional protection for liberty of conscience more generally.
If this argument portends the "end of religious freedom," as some have recently suggested,
see, e.g., SMITH, supra note 1, it does not mean the end of principled legal approaches to the
area as opposed to pure party politics.
30. None of this is to deny the pervasive influence of politics on legal interpretation.
Of course interpretation is shot through with politics. Nevertheless, most people writing
about religious freedom from the left implicitly believe that constitutional law, even if
pervasively political, is still relatively autonomous from electoral strategizing or party
policymaking. Legal discourse has distinctive rules, and lawyers have been trained and
socialized to respect those rules. To put the point somewhat differently, constitutional
politics is not fully reducible to party politics even if it is true that no part of constitutional
law is untouched by power dynamics.
31. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses:
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2010) (responding to
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articulated substantive proposals for how religious freedom cases ought to
be resolved generally and in one area or another. What is missing is a
defense of the project itself, of its very possibility. The availability of a
workable methodology is what is being questioned today, and a way of
working through problems is what needs to be provided and defended.
My aim is to explore whether there is a supportable response to the
skeptical challenge. That endeavor has become more imperative as I have
discovered that the skeptics' ways of working on concrete cases is in fact
strikingly similar to many others', including my own.
In some sense, my goal here is to supplement rather than supplant
existing theories of religious freedom. Instead of a substantive theory of
religious freedom that determines outcomes for specific disputes, I aim to
provide a method for settling religious freedom cases in a way that is
rationally justifiable. This method, though more badly needed by
progressives at the moment, does not dictate conclusions and is available to
everyone. So, one motivation is to discover a satisfying response to the
skeptical challenge. An independent aim, however, is to provide a way of
thinking through these new problems that is useful-that clarifies and
conceptualizes how people are already working through such issues.
Of course, reasoned arguments will not always prevail, and they will
often be influenced by power or overdetermined by interests. And courts
will not provide the only, or even the most promising, institutional settings
for such arguments. Power and political institutions will continue to
exercise important influence and properly so. Social movements, media
outlets, organizations of civic society, and various other groups and forums
likewise will continue to impact constitutional thought. But arguments of
constitutional principle can nonetheless carry significant power in some
social and institutional contexts. Completely abandoning outcomes to the
contingencies of practicalities or politics would be a mistake.
In broad outline, the methodological solution begins with a coherence
method inspired by moral philosophy. Because problems of legal
interpretation inevitably include moral argument, and because the skeptics'
objection is that those problems cannot be resolved without devolving into
irrationality or ipse dixitism, it makes sense to look to moral philosophy for
a starting point. In fact, the skeptics' argument is precisely that moral
reasoning in legal interpretation cannot be accomplished without
conclusoriness. (Here, all parties seem to accept that moral reasoning plays
an appropriate role in legal interpretation-a position I will therefore
critiques by the skeptic Steven Smith by saying only that "very often, reason.., does not
get us to the end of the line.").
Thinking about Religious Freedom
assume rather than establish.32) So, a defense understandably begins with a
better account of moral reasoning on matters of law and politics.
When people confront moral problems in everyday life, they
oftentimes begin with an unreflective intuition-a kind of impulse about
the proper solution. Other times, that does not happen, and they are unsure
what to think about a new conundrum, or they have conflicting instincts.
Whatever the case, they usually do not stop there. Instead, they subject
their first thoughts and feelings to reflection. They test them. Commonly,
people do that by comparing their reactions to other moral conclusions that
they have drawn and about which they have confidence. Those existing
commitments could exist on any level of generality. They could be
judgments about particular situations and their correct resolution, or they
could be general principles that are believed to fairly capture more specific
judgments. Actors' instincts about the new situation appear more
worthwhile if they fit together with general principles and if they resonate
with other specific judgments by way of analogy. 33
That method of seeking coherence--or reflective equilibrium, as it is
sometimes called34-- can assimilate commitments that are complex and
variegated. Even in environments of great moral intricacy, a coherence
method can generate conclusions that are reasonable or morally justified.
In other words, the approach can provide an answer, or the beginning of an
answer, to the charge that religious freedom incorporates values that are too
numerous, and too often conflicting, to produce reasoned outcomes.
Problems of religious freedom can be resolved without conclusoriness, ipse
dixitism, or irrationality-and without theology. Moreover and related, the
coherence approach opens up a powerful defense against charges that
principled decision-making on these questions is inevitably biased or
arbitrary. Finally, it speaks to the concern that religious freedom
jurisprudence invariably involves tradeoffs that we should regard as tragic.
Hard cases can be resolved in favor of prevailing values. As long as the
resolutions are justified, rationally and morally, they should not provide
occasions for regret.
That is the basic idea. Let me now offer a few clarifications or
specifications-seven of them, to be precise.
First, "fitting together" means mutually reinforcing. Conclusions gain
credence through this process not just because they avoid contradiction but
because they support one another. If one element in this web of moral
32. It is beyond the scope of this lecture to establish that legal interpretation involves
moral argument. See, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52, 65-68, 96-98 (1986). So,
coherentism offers a method for resolving legal disputes that is at once normative and
descriptive-it responds to arguments both for what the law is and for what it should be.
33. For a general account, see Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011).
34. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 46-53 (1971).
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belief is questioned, it can be bolstered by the other elements. 35  A
conclusion about the new situation is morally justified, or rationally
warranted, if it coheres with our other commitments in this way.
Second, the commitments that fit together could be on any level of
abstraction. They could be principles, or they could be convictions about
particular, ground-level problems.
Third, as I use the term, coherence speaks to moral justification, not
necessarily to ontology or even epistemology. 37 When a result reached by
this method is claimed to be justified, that means that it is backed by
reasons rather than conclusory or ad hoc conclusions.
Fourth, coherence or equilibrium is best understood as an ideal rather
than a state that is likely to be achieved.38 Emphasis should be placed on
the process of deliberation that it describes rather than on the goal itself.
And, harmony is more likely to be reached in local areas of law and politics
rather than globally.
Fifth, a person's array of beliefs can be dynamic. No element is
foundational and every element is subject to revision in light of new
information or new understandings. People may find that their existing
conclusions need to be revised in light of their considered position on a
new problem. They work back and forth between beliefs, testing each
against the others and seeking a resolution where their positions make
sense taken together.
Sixth, nothing about the approach is inherently backward-looking or
conservative--on the contrary, you could even say it is designed to
generate principled critiques of arrangements that are unquestioned or
inherited. At the same time, it incorporates social specificity because the
principles and judgments that people bring to the table are made available
and authoritative by the country's politics, culture, and history. 39 More on
that social dimension in a moment.
35. See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 277-78
(1992).
36. John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 286, 289
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
37. Id. at 286-87; see also Daniels, supra note 33, at 25 (noting Rawls's distinction
between a coherence theory of truth and a coherence theory ofjustification).
38. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 97 (expanded ed. 2005) ("The struggle for
reflective equilibrium continues indefinitely[.]"); T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT
REASONS 77, n. 14 (2014).
39. Rawls, supra note 36, at 288-89 (arguing that the method of reflective
equilibrium is not conservative); cf DWORKJN, supra note 32, at 99 (arguing for the critical
potential of his interpretive approach).
Thinking about Religious Freedom
Seventh and finally, the approach is well-suited to law, and it has a
recognized application there. 40 It resembles what judges and lawyers do
when they apply the common-law method to legal problems.
Although coherence methods are familiar to philosophers, I want to
foreground an element that usually remains in the background for them.
Treatments of the topic in philosophy tend to undervalue an aspect of moral
reasoning that is central in constitutional argument-the impact of social
and political dynamics. I would like to articulate a social version of the
method. Social coherence better appreciates that the principles and
judgments informing our conclusions are made available by cultural and
political dynamics even as they are also subject to examination. Our sense
of whether and how elements of our worldview fit together can be shaped
by events and evaluations that come to us from the zeitgeist. We are
products of our culture, as the clich6 reminds us, even if we also are
capable of some reflective distance from it.
Moreover, with social influence comes social conflict. We can be
convinced-and we can convince others-to change their conclusions by
pointing out precedents that they have missed, by arguing that principles
demand different results, by showing that a local solution conflicts with
global principles, and by promoting new understandings that better make
sense of existing conclusions. And these contests happen not just in courts
but in legislatures, in executive branch offices, in political parties, in social
movements, in political mobilizations, in the media, in civil society, and
everywhere else that people discuss basic questions of law and justice.
Those conversations are affected by power and interests, without a doubt,
but they also are driven by arguments of constitutional law and principle
that can be important if rarely decisive.
4!
None of this needs to be embarrassing to those who hold that it is
possible to make warranted moral judgments in the area of religious
freedom. On the contrary, appreciating the social and political dimensions
of coherentism increases its relevance to constitutional law, which draws
so much of its legitimacy from popular responsiveness and democratic
engagement.
40. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject
and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 106 (1993) ("Coherence is more
than a property of law; it is the result of a particular way of thinking about the law.").
41. There are at least two reasons to emphasize a social dimension. First, doing so
anticipates and deflects the criticism that legal ideas will be overtaken and overdetermined
by interests and ideologies. Second, it tailors the approach to constitutional law where
social and political dynamics are widely appreciated and where democratic responsiveness
can bolster a certain type of legitimacy. Incidentally, none of this means that moral actors
should go out of their way to incorporate social understandings into their reasoning-that
happens in the background. So, this part of the account is more descriptive than
prescriptive.
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Moreover, a strong social dimension helps to answer the characteristic
critiques of coherence approaches from within philosophy. For example, it
addresses the complaint that the method justifies idiosyncratic belief
systems that may seem internally consistent but are nevertheless unjust or
unsuitable to American constitutionalism. 42 For instance, white supremacy
can never count as warranted-a social perspective makes that obvious.
Nor may an established church pass muster in America even though it may
be acceptable in other constitutional democracies, such as Great Britain's.
Social coherence can account for those convictions and answer those
critiques. Emphasizing the social aspects of our reasoning therefore is
worthwhile, not only for the approach's suitability for constitutional law
but also for its attractiveness within philosophy and in our thinking more
generally.
Let me now illustrate the approach by applying it to a cutting-edge
issue in contemporary religious freedom law. My aim in doing this is not
just-or even mainly-to argue for a particular solution but to demonstrate
the power of this way of thinking in practice. The proposal's truest test
should be whether it provides a useful and attractive technique for solving
actual problems.
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby.43 Again, the
Court ruled that employers who had religious objections to certain forms of
contraception were exempt from the government's requirement that they
include comprehensive contraception coverage in any health insurance
plans that they offered to their employees. 44 Another statute, called the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), protected religious employers
from the "contraception mandate," as it has come to be known. Several
aspects of the decision have drawn controversy, including the holding that
business corporations enjoy religious freedom protection.46 However, I
want to focus here on a different and potentially more profound problem
with Hobby Lobby, namely the Court's violation of the principle against
harming third parties.
A basic tenet of both Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence holds that although religion exemptions can and sometimes
must be granted by the government to religious practitioners, those
42. See Raz, supra note 35, at 280; see also Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Coherentist
Epistemology and Moral Theory, in MORAL KNOWLEDGE? 137, 170 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong & Mark Timmons eds., 1996).
43. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
44. Id. at 2759 (applying 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb4).
45. Id.
46. Horwitz, supra note 2, at 177.
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exemptions may not shift meaningful costs from religious citizens to other
private citizens.47
In its Establishment Clause cases, the Court has invalidated laws that
accommodated religious people if the laws harmed others.4' For instance,
the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that required employers to
allow all employees who observe a Sabbath to take that day off from
work.49  The Court held that the Connecticut law "contravenes a
fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, [namely that] . . . '[t]he First
Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious
necessities.'" 5 0 That principle has been followed in subsequent cases.
In its Free Exercise Clause cases, similarly, the Court has denied relief
that would mean harming other private citizens.52 For example, the Court
refused to grant an exemption to an Amish employer who was theologically
opposed to paying Social Security taxes on behalf of his employees. The
Court held that granting the exemption would impose unacceptable costs
on the third-party employees.5 4 So this legal rule is grounded in both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The principal difficulty with the Court's landmark decision in Hobby
Lobby is that it did not do enough to protect the company's 13,000
employees and their dependents. 55 Although Justice Alito's opinion did
note that Hobby Lobby's employees could be made whole by the
47. For general overviews of this doctrine, see Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. 36-46 (2015) (testimony of Nelson Tebbe, Prof. of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch.);
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The
Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://perma.cc/A4ZTEW6S.
48. See generally Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2004).
49. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710-11.
50. Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.
1953) (Hand, J.)).
51. See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 ("Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries, see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) ... .
52. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982).
53. Id. at 261.
54. Id. ("When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter
of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.
Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the
employer's religious faith on the employees.").
55. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014).
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government, and although the Court arguably reaffirmed the validity of the
principle against harming others, it did not condition relief to the company
on avoidance of harm to its employees.56 And in fact, the company's
employees were harmed.57  They went without coverage for about a year
because the Obama Administration took that long to implement a
solution.58 During that time, Hobby Lobby's employees likely suffered
harm that was irreparable, including unintended pregnancies. 59 Not only
employees at Hobby Lobby itself but also workers for companies that
denied contraception coverage in reliance on the decision were presumably
without contraception coverage.
Therefore, Hobby Lobby itself should come to be seen as an example
of a decision that is unwarranted. Others, including the Justices in the
majority, have focused on other aspects of the decision, but that does not
mean that ignoring or impairing the principle against harming others is
justified. Moreover, jettisoning the rule against third-party harms has
worrisome ramifications for coming fights over reproductive freedom and
LGBT equality. 60  And, this is true not merely as a matter of politics or
pragmatics but as a matter of principle.
56. Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363,
390-391 nn. 128-129 (2015).
57. Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Update on the
Establishment Clause and Third Party Harms: One Ongoing Violation and One
Constitutional Accommodation, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 16, 2014), https://perma.cc/TW7V-
RQ5W; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby's Bitter
Anniversary, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/GRV9-5SEE.
58. For the solution that was eventually implemented, see Coverage of Certain
Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41318 (July 14, 2015).
59. See Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2015) (detailing the
health benefits to women of inexpensive contraception coverage, including the avoidance of
unintended pregnancies, which are associated with other health problems and reduced
participation in economic, social, and political life); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 257-64 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (same).
60. Consider too the heated conflict between marriage equality and traditional
religion. After Obergefell, claims for exemptions for religious traditionalists are affecting
numerous areas of law and policy. People seeking religion exemptions include wedding
vendors who object to serving same-sex couples, adoption agencies affiliated with churches,
employers who want to deny benefits to employees married to someone of the same sex, and
even marriage license clerks and judges who refuse to serve gay and lesbian couples.
Assessing these claims is a perfect test for coherence approaches because advocates on both
sides analogize to existing exemption regimes. Lawyers for the religious actors argue that
their clients are similar to people who are conscientiously opposed to abortion and certain
other medical procedures affecting female reproduction. Such objectors often receive
comparatively strong protection under laws known as refusal clauses or conscience clauses.
Lawyers for same-sex couples, on the other hand, compare marriage equality to civil rights
for racial minorities. There, religion exemptions have been exceedingly narrow. So,
whether exemptions should be awarded depends, in part, on whether they resemble refusal
clauses or civil rights guarantees. See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Marriage Equality
Statutes, 9 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 25 (2015).
Thinking about Religious Freedom
Of course, some will disagree with my reading of the case. But that is
not a debilitating problem for the approach. It only means that we should
now try to convince one another that the other position ignores important
principles or cases or is otherwise unwarranted. It means we should engage
in reasoned moral debate. Because more than one position can be
supported, reasonable disagreement will be a permanent feature of that
debate.6 1 And, that is exactly what is happening with regard to Hobby
Lobby and its many implications for religious freedom law. But, the
permanency of disagreement does not mean that reasonable justification is
impossible.
In conclusion, I would like to briefly revisit the interaction of
skepticism with contemporary political dynamics that I described at the
outset. Constitutional actors should resist the argument that religious
freedom law is necessarily unprincipled and they should resist the
argument that irrationality in the field provides a reason why it should be
left to political institutions and to political arguments even outside those
institutions. Nothing about the method I have sketched here guarantees
outcomes that favor one side or another, but it preserves the possibility for
discussions of constitutional principle at a time when conflicts between
religious freedom and equal citizenship have reached a new level of
intensity.
61. Cf Micah Schwartzman, The Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL. PHIL. &
EcON. 191, 192-93 (2004) (following Gerald Gaus in distinguishing between
"indeterminacy," which is avoidable for particular individuals, and "inconclusiveness,"
which results from rational disagreement among individuals and is "a permanent feature of
liberal politics").
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